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Private incentives to invest in a public good are modeled as self-interested reciprocity where 
individuals use reputational scoring rules to determine their optimal level of investment.  The 
model predicts that the disposition of any subject to cooperate is revealed by their first period 
investment in a voluntary contribution experiment, and that grouping cooperative subjects 
together will improve, and in some circumstances sustain, their private investment in the public 
good.  Actual investment behavior is then studied with laboratory experiments that compare the 
contributions of subjects randomly reassigned into groups to contributions under a mechanism 
that sorts subjects into groups based on their individual investment decisions.  The sorting 
mechanism helps to keep subjects with cooperative dispositions together and leads to statistically 
significant increases, relative to the random matching condition, in cooperators’ investments in 
the public good.  
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 1I.    Introduction 
Property rights can privatize incentives for the provision of goods that confer public benefits.  
Unfortunately, it is often unfeasible to implement a property rights system that truly privatizes 
incentives by making benefits proportional to investments.
1  Nevertheless, there is substantial 
evidence, including Ronald Coase’s (1974) historical research on Great Britain’s lighthouse 
system, that suggests most public goods can be provided privately even without such a system.
2  
So how are public goods provided?  We provide evidence from public goods experiments, which 
suggests that grouping those with cooperative dispositions together can lead to sustainable 
investment in public goods by privately motivated individuals. 
  Existing experimental evidence on the effects grouping cooperative subjects in public 
goods games has arisen largely as a by-product of research designed to test theories of altruism 
and reciprocity (see, e.g., Andreoni (1995) or Croson (1998)).  These experiments were 
motivated, in part, by the well-known results that cooperation in experimental public goods 
games is much greater than standard economic theories of free-riding predict, and that there is 
usually decay in cooperation when public goods games are played over multiple rounds (see, e.g., 
Isaac and Walker (1988)).  Andreoni (1995), for example, employed a novel experimental design 
that took a step towards separating social motives from “confusion” and other sources of high 
contributions,  and concludes that about half of cooperative decay can be attributed to the effects 
of free-riders.  Croson’s (1998) results indicate that individual contributions are related to beliefs 
about and actual group contributions, again providing support for reciprocity theories.
3  We are 
aware of only one previous paper, Orbell and Dawes (1993), that reports data from experiments 
that directly examine the effects of separating free-riders from cooperators.
4 
 2  In this paper we experimentally examine the effect that keeping cooperative subjects 
together has on their public contributions.  We use the “Goodwill Accounting” model of self-
interested reciprocity, first advanced by McCabe and Smith (1999) and reviewed in the next 
section, to organize our analysis.  One important reason is that the Goodwill Accounting theory 
provides a simple and testable procedure to classify each subject as either a “free-rider” or a 
“cooperator.”  Another reason is that the theory provides testable predictions about the effects of 
separating the two types based on their respective public contributions.
5  It is worthwhile to point 
out, however, that the Hypotheses we examine may be consistent with other reciprocity theories.  
Tests of Goodwill Accounting against various alternatives are left for future research. 
The idea behind our experimental design is to compare contributions in a baseline, 
standard 10-round Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (VCM) experiment, where in each round 
subjects are randomly arranged into groups of four, to a treatment condition where in each round 
subjects are sorted, without their knowledge, into groups of four like-contributors.  The effect of 
the treatments, therefore, is to increase the frequency with which cooperators are matched with 
subjects of similar dispositions, while holding all other aspects of the environment fixed.   
  We find that both one’s disposition to cooperate and one’s history of outcomes during the 
play of the game influence public contributions.  In particular, our results suggest that the 
characteristic decay in public contributions is due primarily to decay in the contributions of 
cooperators, and that free-riders play an important role in determining the rate of this decay.  
Specifically, we find that free-riders affect cooperators’ contributions because they reduce a 
group’s provision of the public good. This, in turn, reduces cooperators’ contributions in 
subsequent rounds.    The magnitude of this effect depends both on the rate at which free-riders 
and cooperators meet, and on the level of free-riders’ contributions.  We find two independent 
 3effects: First, the more often cooperators interact with free-riders, the faster they lower their 
contribution. Second, cooperators  also decrease their contributions according to how little free-
riders contribute. Finally, we find that if cooperators meet free-riders infrequently enough, they 
sustain their initial public contributions, particularly when the marginal per-capital return 
(MPCR) to public contributions is not low.  
 
II.  Theory and Hypotheses   
We make use of the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (VCM), which is frequently used to 
examine cooperative behavior (see Davis and Holt (1993) and Ledyard (1995) for reviews).  The 
typical environment includes i = 1, …, N subjects, each with endowment wi.  Subject i 
contributes  i g to the public good and leaves the remainder in a private account.  The total 
contribution to the public good is summed over all the subjects’ contributions; we will denote 
this aggregate by G.  The key to the VCM is that the return on investment in the public account 
differs from that in the private account.  In particular, the return to each person on the total 
investment in the public account is given by r  while, without loss of generality, the return on the 
private account is set to unity.  This means that the payoff function for player i is: 
(, )( ) ii i i g gw g r     G         
 
where  i g  represents the vector of contributions of everyone except subject i.  As long as r  it 
is easy to see that, given any arrangement of contributions by the other subjects, each player i 
maximizes her individual payoff by free-riding, that is, by contributing nothing to the public 
good.  At the same time, if   then it is Pareto optimal for each subject to contribute 




 4is the marginal per-capital return (MPCR).  When designing VCM experiments the MPCR and 
the number of subjects are usually chosen to exploit the tension between free-riding and Pareto 
optimality.     
Experimental research with the VCM has generated at least three widely replicated results 
(see Ledyard (1995)).  First, cooperation is higher than predicted by standard theories of free-
riding, such as the one described above, although there is usually a subset of subjects that 
contribute very little to the public good.  Second, total investment in the public account tends to 
decay when the VCM is played for several rounds, typically ten, and in the last few rounds 
contributions are usually much lower than in the first few rounds.  Third, contributions to the 
public good are usually higher when the MPCR is higher.  
One theory that is consistent with these results, and which motivates the Hypotheses 
tested in this paper, is the “Goodwill Accounting” framework by McCabe and Smith (1999).
6  
This framework assumes that there are subjective benefits and costs to contributing to the public 
account, and that a subject’s contribution in each round maximizes his expected subjective net 
benefit.  Let the subjective expected cost to subject i in round   of contributing  t it g , when the 
MPCR is  , be denoted by Cr  where C  is assumed to be convex and fixed over 
rounds.   is the maximum possible pecuniary cost of an increment in g
r
1
((1- ) ), i g
( , , ii t
i t i
( ) it rg it, holding others’ 
contributions fixed.  The subjective expected benefit of contributing is expressed as the product 
of two terms.  The first term is  ), B gr n where   is the number of subjects in the group.  n i B  is 
assumed to be fixed over rounds, concave in git and increasing in   The subjective 
expected benefit is assumed to be the product of 
and . rn
i B  and a further term that takes account of the 
subject’s beliefs about the characteristics of the people in his group. This second term is    ( , P ) ii t 
 5where   is an index that varies over rounds in a way described below, and that is higher when 
the subject believes the members of his group are more likely to contribute to the public good.
it
 7  
The function  i P  is assumed to be constant over rounds, non-negative, increasing and bounded. It 
is important to emphasize that the functions Bi and Pi, are constant over time because they are 
assumed to reflect individual characteristics and previous experience. Bi and Pi are independent 
of the specific nature of those with whom an individual interacts.  Any effects arising from 
changes in an individual’s beliefs about the willingness of others to contribute to the public good 
are assumed to be captured by changes in her   Hence, denoting by   the period t endowment 
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Figure 1 depicts this optimization problem for the special case where 
(, ( 1 ) ii i t B n g 
1
  This payoff arises if subject   expects all members of the group to 
contribute the amount that she does.  Figure 1A shows the effect of varying expected contribution 
costs with a fixed expected benefit.  For instance, a zero contribution boundary solution obtains 
under the   cost function. A full contribution boundary solution results when costs are 
relatively low, as depicted by cost function C   Figure 1B shows the effect of varying expected 
benefits, holding the cost function fixed.  Note that contributions are lowest when   is lowest. It 
follows that people free-ride for any of two reasons. First, they may find the subjective cost of 
contributing too high, which is consistent with the standard maximizing calculus, requiring no 
i .
 6expectations about others’ behavior.  Second, they have a small value for  i P ( ).  The latter 
implies that the person expects few contributions to the public good by others.  
it
  
According to the Goodwill Accounting theory, any changes in an individual’s public 
contributions over time are exclusively caused by changes in  . Such changes are due to 
modifications in an individual’s perceptions about his group.  Specifically, since subjects only 
observe total contributions   from which they can infer GG  it is natural to assume 
that subjects update  so that   when the aggregate contribution of other group 
members,   is sufficiently low, and that   when the net group contribution is 
sufficiently high.  In particular, suppose that the law of motion for   is 
, it G , it it g 
it
it 
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where   is strictly increasing and takes both positive and negative values.  The initial value 
 is assumed to depend on a subject’s prior beliefs about the likelihood that other subjects will 
contribute to the public good.  
 i 
1 i 
  Our Hypotheses are derived from the special case of the Goodwill Accounting model that 
arises by making the following three assumptions: 
 
A1.  Within any MPCR r, the endowments   benefit functions  , w   and 
r BP , and cost 
function   
r C   are the same for all subjects.  However, individuals evaluate payoffs according to 
their own i and one of two updating rules, 1 
r  (.) or 2 
r  (.) where 1r <
  2 
r  everywhere along 
their common domains. 
r 
 
 7A2.  For each MPCR r there exists some   such that if   then subject   uses updating 
rule   and otherwise they use updating rule       
r r





A3.        and 
r BP 
r   are the same for each r  while     
12 rr CC   whenever    12 . rr 
 
Assumption A1 states that, within any MPCR condition, heterogeneity in contributions is 
due entirely to heterogeneity in   across subjects.  Assumption A2 says that subjects with 
sufficiently pessimistic prior beliefs will update these beliefs more slowly than those who are 
sufficiently optimistic.  Assumption A3 is that the higher the MPCR, the lower the subjective 
costs an individual assigns to contributing.  
These three assumptions are sufficient to generate several testable implications.  
 
Hypothesis 1:  All else equal and in every round, aggregate contributions to the public 
account will not decrease when the MPCR  is increased. 
 
Hypothesis 1 follows from the fact that in higher MPCR environments contributions to the public 
account are less costly.
 8 
 
Hypothesis 2.  Within any MPCR r, subjects who contribute less than an amount 
 in the first round of the experiment will follow a systematically different 
contribution decision rule than subjects who contribute more than this amount in the first 
round of the experiment. 
* (0,100) r V 
 8 
Hypothesis 2 is the foundation of our procedure to classify subjects as either “free-riders” or 
“cooperators.”  It follows directly from A2, the assumption that within any given MPCR level, 
subjects vary only in   and the result that contributions are monotonically increasing in  .  
The important and testable assertion made by this Hypothesis is that individuals can be “typed” 
based on their initial contribution to the public account (note that the cutoff value V  is not 
pinned down by the theory; a point we address in section 4).  A “free-rider” is someone who 
contributes a relatively small amount in the first period, and a “cooperator” is someone who 
contributes a relatively large amount.  The nature of the difference that we expect between free-





Hypothesis 3.  Let    1, 1 ii t t HG       denote the period   history for subject i (the net 
group contribution i has observed in each period up to period  ).  If subject “c” is a 
cooperator and subject “f” is a free-rider, and if  cf H H    , then the cooperator will 
contribute at least as much to the public good in period   as the free-rider will.   
 
Hypothesis 3 states that if, in every round up to  , a cooperator observes a net group 
contribution that is at least as large as the net group contribution a free-rider observes, then the 
cooperator’s contribution to the public good at   will not be smaller than the free-rider’s.  This 
Hypothesis follows from the assumed properties on the  -updating rules      .  
 
 9Hypothesis 4.  An individual’s public contribution in period t is weakly increasing in the 
net contribution of his group in period t-1. 
 
Hypothesis 4 is obtained by observing that  -updating rules are assumed to be weakly 
increasing in the net group contribution G -it, and that an individual’s public contribution is 
(weakly) increasing in his   Note that this Hypothesis does not make any claims about the 
relationship between a subject’s public contributions in adjacent periods.  A subject’s 
contribution may rise, fall, or stay the same between adjacent periods and still be consistent with 
Hypothesis 4. Taken together, Hypotheses 3 and 4 indicate that whether a subject has interacted 
with cooperators or free-riders in previous rounds should affect her current public contribution 
decisions.  This is made clear by our final Hypothesis.  
.
 
Hypothesis 5.   Let   denote a group at round   made up of subjects i, j, k and 
l.  Suppose for some cooperator and free-rider 
(, , ,) ijkl 
. f c H H      Then 
,1 [ | ( , , , )] , , , )], ii ,1 [ | ( g ijkc ijkf    g    and similarly for subjects j and k.   
 
Hypothesis 5 says that a subject who is grouped with a free-rider in round   will not contribute 
more to the public good in round   than he would if that free-rider had been replaced by a 




Our experiments were conducted at the Economic Science Laboratory at the University of 
Arizona.  Subjects were undergraduates at the University of Arizona and were recruited from the 
general student population.  A total of 264 subjects, twelve per session, participated. Each subject 
was seated at a private computer terminal, visually separated from others by blinders, and paid 
privately at the end of the experiment.  
Each of our laboratory sessions included twelve subjects who made decisions into a 
standard, ten round VCM. Subjects were told that each round their group would consist of four 
people including themselves.  Each subject was given one hundred tokens at the beginning of 
each round to invest in either a private account which returned one cent per token to that subject 
alone, or a group account which returned cents at the specified MPCR to everyone in their group 
including themselves.  For example, when the MPCR was 0.5, each token contributed to the 
public account returned 0.5 cents to each person in the group.  After all twelve subjects had made 
their contribution decisions they were separated into three groups of four.  Each subject’s 
earnings were calculated based on the group to which they had been assigned.  Finally, subjects 
were given time to review their results. A new period began when all of the subjects indicated 
that they were ready.   
Table 1 summarizes our experimental design. The design’s main feature is the grouping 
of subjects according to two different rules. The two group assignment rules were crossed with 
three MPCR levels, r=0.30, r=0.50 and r=0.75. In the baseline conditions subjects were assigned 
to groups at random.  At each round, each subject had an equal chance of being grouped with any 
three other subjects.  In our treatment conditions we used a “sorting” rule.  We placed the four 
 11highest investors in the public account into a one group, the fifth through the eighth highest 
investors into another group and the four lowest investors in the public account into a third 
group.
9  Subjects were given very limited information about the nature of the assignment rule.  
The exact instructions they received are reported in Appendix A.  The only information the 
instructions contain about the group assignment rule is:  "…, once everyone has submitted his or 
her investment decision, you will be assigned to a group with four members (including yourself).  
Your total group investment will then be determined and your experimental earnings calculated."   
The main reason for not telling subjects the assignment rule was the concern that 
differences in strategic behavior generated by their knowledge of the grouping rule might 
confound reciprocity effects.  For example, a cooperator in the sorted condition who knows the 
assignment rule and contributes a relatively large amount may be doing so for two reasons. She 
may contribute because she is not meeting free-riders as frequently as she would in the random 
condition, or she may simply want  to be part of the “top” group. There seems to be no easy way 
to disentangle these two motives.  We chose to circumvent this potential problem by keeping 
subjects ignorant about the group assignment rule. 
  Several additional aspects of our design deserve comment. First, note that the “sorted” 
group assignment rule depends only on the subjects’ current contributions.  In particular, we do 
not use any information on whether a subject is a free-rider or cooperator when we form groups.  
The reason is that the proportion of free-riders and cooperators need not easily accommodate 
three groups of four individuals. Since our goal was only to reduce the frequency with which 
free-riders and cooperators meet, our procedure is superior to the alternative of employing a large 
number of ad-hoc assignment rules to handle various type-contribution combinations. 
 12  A second important feature of our design is that, although subjects under different 
grouping rules do experience different feedback, the VCM’s rules, particularly its payoff 
structure, are identical in all in all experimental sessions. Any learning about its incentives 
should therefore occur in about the same way in all treatments.  It is important to emphasize that 
there is no reason to suspect that subjects in the sorted treatments knew they were being matched 
with like-contributors.  In principle, of course, a clever subject in the sorted condition could 
discover something about the grouping rule through systematic experimentation.  However, the 
incentives to experiment are reduced by the fact that all subjects knew that play is limited to ten 
rounds. 
  A final point to note about our design is that in the first round subjects in both grouping 
conditions were in identical situations. Hypothesis 2 states that a subject’s initial contribution 
reveals whether he is a cooperator or a free-rider.  Since subjects’ situations were identical in the 
first round, it is reasonable to draw between-condition comparisons in the contributions of 
subjects of the same type.   
The analysis of our experimental data proceeds as follows.  We test Hypothesis 1 by 
comparing aggregate contributions between MPCR conditions.  Hypotheses 2 and 3 are tested 
jointly by first specifying a critical value V  and then comparing the contributions of the 
resulting free-riders and cooperators within the random condition.  We use the random condition 
because under this condition cooperators and free-riders observe very similar net group 
contribution histories.  Hence, any systematic differences in their contribution behavior in the 
random condition is evidence of them using different decision rules.  We examine whether any 
systematic differences found are consistent with Hypothesis 3. We test Hypothesis 4 by 
estimating the importance of previous net group contributions to individuals’ decision rules. 
*
r
 13Hypothesis 5 is tested by comparing contributions between the random and sorted conditions. 
The sorted condition effectively replaces some of the free-riders that cooperators encounter in the 
random condition with other cooperators that have, on average, better contribution histories than 
the free-riders they replace.  Hence, Hypothesis 5 suggests that cooperators’ average 
contributions should not be smaller in the sorted condition than in the random condition.  It also 





Figure 2 plots the mean contribution to the public account per period, separately for each 
cell of our design.  The results from the random treatments are consistent with common findings 
in the public goods literature.  In both the 0.75 and 0.50 MPCR conditions, cooperation in the 
random treatment seems higher than is plausibly consistent with free-rider theories.  When the 
MPCR is 0.3, cooperation in the random treatment decays very quickly.  It falls from initial 
period average contributions of 40 out of 100 to less than ten by period seven, and nearly to zero 
in the last two rounds.  Like Isaac and Walker (1988) and others, we find that when the MPCR is 
higher both the rate of cooperative decay is slower and, in support of Hypothesis 1, the 
contributions to the public account are higher.
11  Figure 2 also shows that within each MPCR 
condition the aggregate contributions in the sorted condition always exceed those in the random 
condition.  Moreover, the decay in contributions is slower in the sorted condition.  When the 
MPCR is 0.3, contributions in the sorted condition begin at about 45 and decay only to 26, but in 
the two higher MPCR conditions within the sorted treatments there is little evidence of any 
aggregate decay.  
 14  The remainder of our analysis proceeds as follows.  First, following Hypothesis 2, we 
label each subject as either a free-rider or a cooperator based on his first-round contribution to 
the public account.  We then provide statistical evidence that supports this classification 
procedure.  Finally, we analyze the effects that free-riders have on cooperators’ public 
contributions. 
 
IV.A.  Classifying Free-Riders and Cooperators   
According to Hypothesis 2, a subject’s first-round contribution to the public good reveals 
whether she is a free-rider or a cooperator.  In particular, a subject who contributes below a 
specific cutoff value V   which may depend on the MPCR, is a free-rider. Anyone whose 
contribution exceeds V is a cooperator.  Unfortunately, the particular value of each V  is not 
pinned down by the theory.  Consequently, a certain degree of arbitrariness is unavoidable in our 
classification procedure.  For each MPCR, we chose to classify subjects who contributed 0-30 







Hypothesis 2 states that free-riders will contribute systematically differently from 
cooperators. Hypothesis 3 elaborates on Hypothesis 2 by saying that a free-rider will contribute 
less than a cooperator with the same group contribution history. In the random condition free-
rider and cooperator group contribution histories, net of own contribution, should be very similar, 
whatever the MPCR level.  Table 2 shows that this is the case. The table shows mean net group 
contributions per round for each cell of our design and for both types of subjects.
13  Figure 3, 
which plots, for each cell, the mean contributions per round of both free-riders and cooperators, 
shows that in every round and under every MPCR in the random condition cooperators contribute 
 15on average more than free-riders do. In the lower MPCR condition (r = 0.3) all of the 
contributions collapse to zero. This masks any differences in the propensities to contribute, 
although the hypothesis that the free-rider contribution distribution has a higher median is 
rejected by Jonckheere (1954) test at standard significance levels in all rounds.  On the other 
hand, when the MPCR is 0.5 the difference in contributions is statistically significant at standard 
significance levels in all rounds. When the MPCR is 0.75 the difference is significant in all 
rounds but one.
14   
Table 2 also shows that in the sorted condition cooperator histories are better, on average, 
than free-rider histories. Hypothesis 3 states that under the sorted condition, free-riders will not 
contribute more than cooperators. This is supported by the graphs in the right half of Figure 3. 
We reject at standard significance levels in all rounds and MPCR conditions the hypothesis that 
the median of the free-rider’s contribution distribution exceeds the median of the cooperators’ 
contribution distribution.
15  All of this is evidence in favor of Hypotheses 2 and 3, and therefore 
supports our classification procedure.   
A second way to assess the validity of our classification procedure is to estimate and 
compare decision rules used by cooperators and free-riders.  We investigate whether, as the 
theory suggests, cooperators within an MPCR but in different treatments (random or sorted) use 
similar decision rules, whether free-riders within an MPCR but in different treatments use similar 
decision rules, and whether the cooperator and free-rider decision rules are significantly different.   
The arguments to include in the subjects’ decision rules are implied by the model of 
Goodwill Accounting.  The same state-variables should enter both the cooperator and free-rider 
decision rules, and should include the MPCR (from Hypothesis 1), the lagged net group 
contribution (from Hypothesis 4), and previous individual contributions (since expectations 
 16about others’ contributions are individual specific and persistent).  In addition, it is reasonable to 
include the round number in order to capture any temporal effects not accounted for by other 
terms, such as learning about incentives.   
We assume that the decision rules can be accurately represented by a model that includes 
the following regressors:  an intercept, a dummy for the 0.5 and 0.75 MPCR conditions, an 
indicator for the round, the one-period lagged individual contribution and its square, the one-
period lagged contribution of the group to which the subject was assigned, (net of the subject’s 
own contribution) and its square, and the interaction of the lagged individual and group 
contribution.  The squared and interaction terms are included to capture nonlinearities in the 
decision rule.  We account for the restriction that contributions must lie between zero and 100, 
and that there are a substantial number of contributions at both boundaries, by estimating a Tobit 
specification.  That is, we assume that the decision rule that determines the contribution made by  
subject   at round t depends on their type, denoted by “a” and representing either cooperator or 
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Here, c  is the contribution assuming the type is “a”,  nat a   is a type-dependent vector of regressor 
coefficients, and   is the variance of the appropriate idiosyncratic component.  Under regularity 
conditions, the parameter estimates obtained by maximizing the log-likelihood implied by (2) are 




 17  We estimated (2), under the regressor structure described above, separately for 
cooperators and free-riders and taking the first-round observations as given.  There remained 
1683 observations on cooperators and 693 for free-riders.  There were 197 and 255 “0” 
contributions for cooperators and free-riders, respectively, while the counts for “100” (full) 
contributions were 364 and 30, respectively.  
Table 3 provides point estimates, in tokens, for the cooperator and free-rider decision 
rules.  The estimates are consistent with the Hypothesis that cooperators and free-riders follow 
statistically significantly different decision rules.
17  Moreover, cooperators in the random and 
sorted conditions follow decision rules that are statistically indistinguishable, and similarly for 
free-riders.
18  These results suggest that, within MPCR conditions, contributions within types 
differ across treatments (sorting rules) only because the values of the state-variables they use for 
their decision rules differ across treatments.   
As reported in Table 3, the MPCR effect is very small and statistically insignificant for 
free-riders.  For cooperators the effect is larger and significant, and has the expected ordering 
consistent with Hypothesis 1.  The magnitude of the round effect is very small for both free-
riders and cooperators.  Observe that the estimated decision rules are evidence in favor of 
Hypothesis 4, in that they are strictly increasing in the lagged, net group contribution for all 
values of that contribution between zero and 100.  This is evidence that both free-riders and 
cooperators reciprocate previous net group contributions to the public good.    
 
IV.B.  Cooperators’ Public Contributions  
Figure 3 shows free-riders’ and cooperators’ average public good contributions per cell and per 
round.  In the random condition there is evident decay at each MPCR, although this decay 
 18appears to slow as the MPCR increases.  In all cells of the random condition, most of the overall 
decrease in contributions between the first and last rounds is due to decay in cooperator 
contributions.  Within each MPCR, cooperators’ contributions in the sorted condition exceed 
cooperator contributions in the random conditions no later than the fourth round, and continue to 
do so until round 10.  Nonparametric Jonckheere (1954) tests of the significance of the difference 
between random and sorted conditions show that the distribution of cooperator distributions in 
the sorted treatments has a significantly higher median within each round, at the 5% significance 
level, from rounds five through ten when the MPCR is 0.3 and 0.5, and from rounds five through 
nine when the MPCR is 0.75.
19 
  Table 2 also shows average histories for cooperators in each experimental condition. 
Within each MPCR of the sorted condition cooperators’ net group contribution distributions are 
significantly higher than under the random condition in almost every round.
20  Table 4 provides 
evidence that the improved histories stem from a reduction in the frequency of encounters with 
free-riders. The average number of free-riders that each cooperator met per round varied from a 
high of 1.71 in the random, lowest MPCR condition to a low 0.40 in the highest MPCR, sorted 
treatment.  Hence, the sorted treatment gave cooperators better net group contribution histories 
by reducing their encounters with free-riders and, in support of Hypotheses 2 and 5, this seems to 
be the source of their relatively higher public contributions in this treatment.   
Given this, Hypothesis 5 suggests that decay in public contributions will be smaller in the 
sorted conditions.  One reasonable measure of contribution decay is the difference between 
average contributions in the first and last round. By this measure, it is clear from Figure 3 that 
aggregate decay in the random conditions is due almost entirely to decay in cooperators’ 
 19contributions and that this decay is very small in the two higher MPCR conditions (0.50 and 
0.75) of the sorted treatments.   
Figure 4 plots the relationship between the rate of decay in cooperators’ contributions and 
the frequency of their encounters with free-riders. Decay is measured as the difference between 
initial and final average public contributions.  The vertical axis in Figure 4 measures decay, the 
horizontal axis measures the frequency of encountering a free-rider.  The pattern suggests that as 
the frequency of encounters with free-riders increases, the rate at which cooperators’ public 
contributions decay also tends to increase. This provides support for  Hypothesis 5 which states 
that, all else equal, replacing a group’s free-riders with cooperators will lead the group’s 
remaining members to contribute more in subsequent rounds.   
Figure 4 shows that when the MPCR is 0.5 and subjects are sorted according to their 
contributions, decay in cooperators’ contributions is smaller than might be expected, given the 
frequency of encounters between cooperators and free-riders. This is also the only case in which 
free-rider contributions are significantly higher in the sorted than in the random treatment.
21  The 
results from this condition can be viewed as further support of Hypothesis 4, which suggests that 
increasing free-riders’ contributions, and therefore improving net group contributions, should 
lead cooperators to reduce their contributions more slowly. 
Although our primary interest is in cooperators’ public contributions, it is worthwhile to 
comment briefly on free-riders’ contributions.  Within each MPCR free-riders meet each other 
more frequently in the sorted treatments.
22  Figure 3 shows that this depresses free-rider 
contributions in the sorted treatments, in relation to the random treatment, within the 0.3 and 0.75 
MPCR conditions, although, as noted, this does not occur in the sorted treatment when the 
MPCR is 0.5.  
 20 
IV.C.  Efficiencies of Payoffs 
Our discussion has focused on how separating free-riders from cooperators affects the latter's 
contribution decisions.  It is clear from Figure 3 that sorting in high MPCR environments 
increased the public contributions of cooperators less than sorting in lower MPCR environments.  
This does imply that the benefit of sorting, in terms of increased payoffs, is higher within lower 
MPCR environments.  The reason is that when the MPCR is relatively low the efficient payoff, 
defined as the payoff everyone receives when everybody contributes all of their tokens to the 
public good, is not very different from the payoff obtained when everybody contributes nothing. 
  Figure 5 plots average payoffs for free-riders and cooperators in each experimental 
condition, as a fraction of the efficient payoff.  In our experiments cooperators’ relative payoff 
efficiencies increased more when the MPCR was higher, while the efficiencies of free-rider 
payoffs declined more.  The average free-rider payoff in the first round of the random condition 
when the MPCR is 0.3 is larger than the efficient payoff.  The reason is that, for example, if a 
zero-contributor is matched with three 100-contributers when the MPCR is 0.3 then the zero-
contributor receives a payoff of 190.  
 
V. Conclusion 
This paper analyzed data from a series of VCM experiments designed to investigate how 
private contributions to public goods are affected by separating individuals with higher and lower 
propensities to contribute.  Our study was organized by the theory of Goodwill Accounting 
(McCabe and Smith,1999), a theory of self-interested reciprocity based on reputational scoring.  
 21The theory is consistent with the results of many previous VCM experiments, and several 
Hypotheses it suggests are supported by the results of this paper.   
Our study proceeded by first classifying subjects as either free-riders or cooperators.  We 
then compared contributions across experimental conditions that differed only in the frequency 
with which free-riders and cooperators interacted.  The results of our analysis provide the first 
direct evidence on the effects of keeping cooperative subjects together in multi-round public 
goods games. 
  In the random assignment condition, where cooperators and free-riders interacted 
frequently, we found characteristic decay in aggregate contributions to the public good. Almost 
all of this decay can be attributed to decay in cooperators’ contributions.  In the sorted treatments, 
where cooperators meet free-riders less often, we found much slower rates of decay.  In fact, by 
sufficiently reducing cooperators' interactions with free-riders we found that, at least when the 
MPCR is not too low, cooperators’ public contributions were sustained.   
Our laboratory results lend support and additional explanation for Elinor Ostrom’s (1990, 
1992) field observations on sustainable commons systems.  She derives eight design principles 
for long-enduring, self-organized commons systems from these observations.  One of these is the 
Minimal Recognition of Rights to Organize.   This paper’s findings are consistent with the view 
that commons systems are more likely to be enduring if cooperators are given a right to organize 
into groups of similarly disposed individuals.  
Our design and analysis rested on a number of restrictive conditions that future research 
might relax.  One restriction important for our purposes was that subjects were not told about the 
sorting mechanism.  In many actual situations, however, people will know when exclusion 
restrictions are enforced and this may change their behavior.  A second restriction was that the 
 22number of subjects in each group was always four, which means that our research has neglected 
potentially interesting group size effects.   
 23 
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 25Appendix A 
Exact Transcript of Instructions For MPCR = .5 Experiments  
This is an experiment in the economics of group decision-making.  You have already 
earned $5.00 for showing up at the appointed time. If you follow the instructions closely and 
make decisions carefully, you will make a substantial amount of money in addition to your show-
up fee.  
There will be 10 decision-making periods. In each period, you are given an endowment of 
tokens.  You need to decide how to divide these tokens between two accounts: a private account 
and a public account.  
Each token you place in the private account generates a cash return to you (and to you 
alone) of 1 cent.  
Tokens that group members invest in the public account will be added together to form 
the group investment. The group investment generates a cash return of 2 cents per token. These 
earnings are then divided equally between group members. Your group has 4 members (including 
yourself).  
Returns to the group investment are illustrated in the table below.  The left column lists 
various amounts of group investment; the right column contains the corresponding personal 
earnings for each group member.  
Returns from the Group Investment 
Total investment by  Return to each group 
your group  member  
  (From group investment) 
0 0 
 20  10 
40 20 
60 30 







Your token endowment for each period, as well as your decisions and earnings, will show on the 
Record Sheet.  Each row on the Record Sheet will represent a single decision period.  
Example: 
Assume that, in a specific period, your endowment is 100 tokens. Assume further that you decide 
to contribute 50 tokens to your private account and 50 tokens to the public account. The other 
group members together contribute an additional 250 tokens to their public accounts. That makes 
the group investment 300 tokens, which generates 600 cents (300 * 2 = 600). The 600 cents are 
then split equally among the 4 group members. Therefore, each group members earns 150 cents 
from the group investment (600/4=150). In addition to earnings from the group account, each 
member gets 1 cent for every token invested in his/her private account. As you invested 50 
tokens in the private account, your total profit in this period is 150 + 50 = 200 cents. Take a look 
at the Record Sheet. It displays the information for this hypothetical period. During the actual 
experiment, information will be displayed on the Record Sheet in the same way.  
 
Each period proceeds as follows: 
First, decide on the number of tokens to place in the private and in the public account, 
respectively.  Use the mouse to move your cursor to the box labeled “Private Account”. To make 
your private investment, click on the box and enter the number of tokens you wish to allocate to 
this account.  Do likewise for the box labeled “Public Account” Entries in the two boxes must 
 27sum to your endowment. To change any of your entries, use the mouse to select what you have 
previously typed in that box and overwrite. To submit your investment click on the “Submit” 
button.  You will then wait until everyone else has submitted his or her investment decision. 
Second, once everyone has submitted his or her investment decision, you will be assigned 
to a group with 4 members (including yourself).  Your total group investment will then be 
determined and your experimental earnings calculated. 
Third, you will receive a message with your experimental earnings for the period. This 
information will also appear in your Record Sheet. 
 
A new period will begin after everyone has acknowledged his or her earnings message. 
After the last period, you will receive a message with your total experimental earnings 
(sum of earnings in each period). 
 
This is the end of the instructions. If you have finished reading these instructions, push 









 28Appendix B.  Contribution Data by Individual 
Cooperators in Sorted Condition:  MPCR = 0.3
Round 123456789
1 100 84 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75
2 100 100 100 100 100 0 0 0 0 0
3 75 100 100 80 85 95 100 75 80 95
47 54 06 05 01 01 02 54 0 0
5 1 0 09 05 0 01 02 03 04 03 84
68 06 02 06 08 01 07 03 0 0
Mean 88.3 79.0 67.5 60.8 60.0 35.0 50.0 43.3 32.2 38.3
Cooperators in Random Condition:  MPCR = 0.3
Round 123456789
1 100 100 100 0 0 0 0 20 0 0
2 100 0 0 50 0 0 80 10 0 0
37 59 55 02 58 03 02 53 57 0
4 1 0 000 1 0 0000000
5 1 0 0 59 59 0 1 0 0 0 52 5 31
6 100 75 0 20 10 0 0 25 0 2
7 9 9 5 0 1 0 0 1 0 0000000
Mean 96.3 46.4 49.3 55.0 27.1 4.3 15.7 16.4 10.4 1.7
Cooperators in Sorted Condition:  MPCR = 0.5
Round 123456789
1 100 50 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
27 56 56 07 55 08 07 55 08 59
3 100 100 100 95 100 100 100 100 100 100
4 100 100 90 80 90 80 70 80 90 80
59 09 08 09 5 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 09 08 09
68 08 58 08 08 57 58 08 59 09
7 80 85 90 95 100 100 85 80 85 80
8 100 90 90 95 95 100 100 100 100 100
9 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 100 100 100
10 99 99 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
11 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
12 100 50 50 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
13 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
14 100 100 0 75 100 100 100 100 100 100
15 75 80 85 80 85 80 80 50 80 80
16 75 75 75 100 100 100 100 100 100 90
17 90 50 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
18 75 80 60 50 80 60 75 60 75 60













 29Cooperators in Random Condition:  MPCR = 0.5
Round 123456789
17 55 01 59 05 02 58 5 1 0 0 09
2 75 100 30 25 18 23 25 23 30 25
3 90 100 80 90 80 100 90 50 70 100
4 100 100 100 100 70 70 100 70 70 0
5 100 50 60 100 50 100 80 20 30 50
67 58 09 58 55 06 07 56 0 1 0 0
77 48 88 96 79 44 79 93 44 57
8 100 100 100 60 60 60 100 50 60 60
9 7 5 8 0 1 0 0 7 0 2 05555
10 75 20 95 10 5 70 15 100 35 9
11 80 85 90 99 30 85 90 10 80 100
12 100 100 0 80 100 0 50 0 60 0
13 75 50 25 25 10 40 25 25 15 25
14 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1 5 1 0 07 55 05 02 57 5 1 0 0 05 0
16 100 100 100 100 100 75 70 50 15 0
17 100 25 25 25 100 50 25 25 100 25
18 75 25 50 25 50 25 10 90 75 25
1 9 8 0 1 0 0 9 0 9 0 9 0 5 0 7 0000
20 75 40 50 25 40 50 30 60 20 40
21 75 75 75 95 0 50 50 0 0 95
22 80 75 100 75 100 80 50 75 70 75
2 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 00000000
24 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Mean 86.6 75.8 71.6 66.1 55.9 55.8 60.2 43.6 47.1 44.5
Cooperators in Sorted Condition:  MPCR = 0.75
Round 123456789
1 100 80 90 100 90 100 100 100 100 100
2 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
3 85 90 95 95 100 100 100 100 100 100
4 75 90 70 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
57 58 09 09 59 09 6 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
67 58 08 59 08 59 59 59 09 58
7 75 90 100 90 100 95 100 100 100 100
8 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
9 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 90
10 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1 1 9 0 9 2 1 0 00 2 515000
12 80 100 0 0 90 80 100 100 100 100
13 80 80 90 85 86 100 100 100 100 100
14 75 25 75 70 90 99 100 100 100 100
15 75 80 90 85 86 84 85 90 80 0
16 75 100 25 100 100 100 100 100 100 0
Mean 85.0 86.7 81.9 81.9 90.1 90.6 92.8 92.5 92.2 79.7
Cooperators in Random Condition:  MPCR = 0.75
Round 123456789
1 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
2 100 25 50 50 50 0 50 25 0 0
3 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
4 85 90 100 100 80 100 100 50 100 100
58 09 09 09 09 09 09 09 0 1 0 0 1
67 52 55 06 53 52 52 02 52 55
7 100 100 100 100 100 90 100 100 100 100
87 58 08 08 08 08 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
9 100 80 100 100 90 50 60 65 60 100
10 75 75 80 75 50 80 50 75 50 100
11 75 80 75 90 90 100 100 90 90 100
1 2 9 0 1 0 0 1 0 00 1 0 0000 2 0
13 100 100 100 75 100 100 100 50 50 50
14 90 75 100 90 95 95 100 100 90 90
15 80 95 75 85 100 95 90 80 95 70
1 6 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0000
1 7 7 5 5 5 6 0 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5000
18 75 50 25 50 45 40 30 45 25 45



















 30Free-Riders in Sorted Condition:  MPCR = 0.3
Round 123456789
1 3 05100 1 00010
22 53 02 01 02 51 51 01 0 0
32 03 05 01 06 01 02 0 0 1
4000005 1 0 1 05
5 30 0 0 10 10 10 10 10 1 10
65 2 010025 1 5 1 0
70000000000
80000000000
9 3 0 4 0111215 1 0
1 0 3 00 2 00102220




Mean 13.9 10.0 8.8 5.1 9.4 6.4 6.6 5.9 4.3 3.4




33 02 54 04 01 02 01 01 0 5
42 55 07 55 08 55 01 5 5 1
5 5 10 12 20 15 1 10 10 10 5
63 0 04 01 0 0 0 04 0 0
72 52 02 0 5 5 4 3 51 0
80000000003
90000000000
10 20 30 30 40 40 30 5 5 0 0
11 20 40 30 50 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 25 25 75 75 15 10 10 10 10 0
13 25 15 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0
14 30 30 0 20 10 10 0 0 0 0
15 10 20 30 50 30 0 30 0 1 1
16 30 30 50 20 30 70 10 15 30 25
1 7 1 00 2 0 5 0000050
1 81111110010
19 1 5 10 15 10 1 10 1 1 1













 31Free-Riders in Sorted Condition:  MPCR = 0.5
Round 123456789
1 2 5000500000
22 52 52 55 02 55 07 55 02 52
3 0 20 35 40 50 70 40 45 50 30
40000000000
52 53 03 55 06 55 55 06 07 53
62 55 06 07 07 58 08 59 09 59
7 25 75 90 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
8 0 20 20 30 20 30 0 10 15 15
90000000000
10 25 75 90 100 95 65 75 60 65 75
11 25 50 75 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
12 20 20 10 20 25 20 20 30 20 10
13 4 20 88 100 100 100 50 100 100 100
14 0 0 20 30 0 100 100 0 0 10
Mean 14.2 27.5 39.1 49.3 47.1 55.0 49.6 46.1 46.1 42.1
Free-Riders in Random Condition:  MPCR = 0.5
Round 123456789
12 03 04 0 01 0 0 01 0 0
20000000000
30 1 00550000
40 2 00 2 50 1 5050
52 51 5 0 01 01 51 01 51 5
6 10 0 30 10 0 0 20 0 0 10
7 2 0 8 000 5 0 8 00051
82 55 07 53 5 03 55 03 5 0
92 55 04 04 04 04 05 05 04 04
10 20 30 35 10 30 0 25 10 40 10
11 25 70 60 90 60 75 5 70 20 20
1 2 1 0511151111
13 25 50 40 40 50 50 50 0 20 25
1 4 1 0000000050
15 0 100 100 25 50 75 50 100 0 0
16 30 20 40 50 40 30 0 10 20 10
17 25 75 15 10 12 45 25 65 5 0
1 80000000000
Mean 15.0 33.6 26.4 18.9 19.9 25.8 15.9 20.6 9.5 13.4
Free-Riders in Sorted Condition:  MPCR = 0.75
Round 123456789
12 55 58 07 09 0 1 0 07 0 1 0 07 58
20000000000
30000000000
42 55 05 05 56 06 05 05 05 0
5 1 08641 1 08 1 08
60000000000
Mean 10.0 18.8 22.7 21.5 25.2 28.3 21.3 26.7 22.2 14.5
Free-Riders in Random Condition:  MPCR = 0.75
Round 123456789
1 0 03 05 02 02 0 03 01 0
2 20 50 70 80 80 100 50 65 80 90
32 02 02 02 01 51 55 01 57 52
42 01 09 05 06 07 04 03 05 0
52 52 03 05 07 02 53 02 53 01
62 53 02 53 52 53 02 03 04 02
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NOTES 
1 In the accounting literature, to implement a property rights system requires the ability to make 
participants accountable for the effect of their actions on a group’s outcome (see Dickhaut and McCabe 
(1997).)  Assigning such accountability is often made very difficult by the presence of asymmetric 
information, the complexity of interactions between individuals and the fact that actions and outcomes 
measurements are often highly subjective. 
2 Coase reports that lighthouse fees were collected by an agent at port.  In our view, the government need 
not have played much role in enforcing fee collection since the lighthouse’s benefits would be clear to its 
users and any free-riders could be easily discovered and privately punished (see Yamagishi (1985, 1986) 
for evidence that individuals contribute more readily to the second order public goods problem of 
providing a functioning system to punish free-riders than to the original public goods problem.) 
3 There is substantial evidence that supports reciprocity in other experimental environments.  For 
instance, Kurzban et. al. (1999) find strong evidence for reciprocity in a real-time public goods game and 
Berg et. al. (1995) find evidence of reciprocity in an experimental bargaining game. 
4 Orbell and Dawes give subjects the option of not playing a two-person Prisoner’s Dilemma game and 
find that subjects who choose to play the game are more cooperative and thus achieve more efficient 
outcomes compared to subjects who were forced to play.  They argue that subjects who were intending to 
defect were more likely to choose not to play. We interpret this option as providing a behaviorally 
induced exclusion device on free-riders.  
5 The Hypotheses we examine may be consistent with other reciprocity theories.  Tests of Goodwill 
Accounting against various alternatives are left for future research. 
6 Alternative theories of reciprocity have been suggested by several others (see, e.g., Sugden (1984), 
Croson (1998) and Ledyard (1995)).  
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i
7 McCabe and Smith (1999) point out that   can often be thought of as a measure of “goodwill” that an 
individual has towards the group. 
8 More formally, first note that the boundary conditions imply the weak inequality.  For interior solutions, 
first order conditions imply Pi(it) r (n-1) = [1-r]Ci'([1-r]git).  Since Ci is convex, Ci'and Ci'' are positive, 
and Ci' has an inverse, call it Di, such that Di' is positive.  This allows us to solve for git*(r) = Di([Pi(it) r 
(n-1)]/[1-r])/[1-r].  Since 0<r<1 and Di' is positive, 
d git*(r) > 0. 
   d r 
9 Ties were broken using randomization.  For example, if five subjects in the sorted condition contributed 
100, then each of the five unique ways of forming a group of four subjects is equally likely to become the 
high group. 
 
10 All of our Hypotheses are tested by examining average play.  The reason is that even if the theory is 
correct and all subjects are classified correctly it is still likely that subjects make decisions with errors.  
As long as these errors are independent across subjects and rounds it is appropriate to assess the theory 
by examining means. 
11 All references to Hypotheses refer to those discussed in section II of this paper. 
12 Isaac and Walker (1988) labeled subjects who contributed less than 1/3 of their tokens as “strong free-
riders.” 
13 Assessing the significance of the difference is cumbersome since the net group contribution series are 
not independent, and seems unnecessary since the design implies that differences in the series are 
primarily due to randomness.  
14 We tested the Hypothesis that, within each round, the medians of the free-rider and cooperator 
contribution distributions are the same against the alternative that the median of the cooperator 
distributions are higher, using nonparametric Jonckheere (1954) tests.  When the MPCR is 0.5 we find in 
 34                                                                                                                                                                                           
favor of the alternative at the 1% significance level in all of the rounds.  When the MPCR is 0.75 we find 
in favor of the alternative at the 1% level except in rounds six and nine, and in round nine the difference 
is significant at the 5% level.   
15 Jonckheere tests of the null Hypothesis that the medians are the same against the alternative that free-
riders have a higher median reject the alternative in all cases at the 10% level.  Tests against the 
alternative that the cooperator distribution is higher accept the alternative at the 1% level except in 
rounds 4 through 10 when the MPCR is 0.5. 
16 Our analysis does not include individual random or fixed effects.  The reason is that, as can be 
immediately seen from the data appendix, many of our free-riders exhibit very little variation in the 
amount they contribute to the public good.  For example, five of 14 free-riders contribute zero every 
round in the sorted condition when the MPCR is 0.3.  Hence, individual effects are either not, or only 
very weakly, separately identified from the lagged individual contribution effects for many of our 
subjects.   
17 An F-test of the Hypothesis that the coefficients of the two decision rules are all the same is rejected at 
the 1% significance level. 
18 To test the similarity of decision rules across the random and sorted treatments we estimated (2) under 
a regressor structure that interacted a dummy that took the value one in the sorted condition with the 
round, the lagged individual and group contributions and their square and interaction.  Evidence in favor 
of similar decision rules is found if the coefficients of these six terms are jointly statistically 
insignificant.  For cooperators, the terms are jointly insignificant at the 1% significance level 
(F(6,1669)=2.10).  For free-riders, although the six terms are jointly significant at the 1% level 
(F(6,679)=4.62), five of the six terms are jointly insignificant at the 1% significance level 
(F(5,679)=2.35) and the remaining term, the interaction of the sorted condition with lagged individual 
contributions, is individually insignificant at the 5% level.  Hence, in both cases the balance of the 
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evidence supports the Hypothesis that the decision rules are the same in the random and sorted 
conditions.    
19 In the first few rounds within each MPCR we cannot reject the Hypothesis that the contribution 
distributions are the same in both the random and sorted conditions. 
20 Jonckheere tests find that the median of the distribution in the sorted treatments is significantly higher 
at the 5% level except in round four when the MPCR is 0.3, rounds one and two when the MPCR is 0.5 
and rounds one, two, three and ten when the MPCR is 0.75, where we cannot reject the Hypothesis that 
the medians are the same.  
21 Based on Jonckheere tests, the medians of the free-riders’ contribution distributions in the random and 
sorted condition are indistinguishable in every round when the MPCR is 0.3, but are higher at the 5% 
significance level in the sorted condition in rounds five, seven, nine and ten when the MPCR is 0.5, and 
are higher in the random condition at the 5% significance level in rounds three, five, six, nine and ten 
when the MPCR is 0.75.    
22 The frequencies are, in order of increasing MPCR, 1.2, 0.4 and 0.5 and 1.8, 2.2, and 2.3 in the random 
















      
Matching Condition  MPCR 
   0.3  0.5  0.75 
Random  3/36/360* 5/60/600 3/36/360
Sorted  3/36/360 5/60/600 3/36/360
      
*a/b/c where a = number of sessions, 
 b = number of subjects, and 
 c = number of observations. 
 
 37Table 2 
 
Mean Net Group Contributions by Experiment and Type 
 
      
1  2  3  4  56789   1 0
      
126 93 91  100 39 25 33 17 13 14
120 84  100 68 62 37 29 29 25 12
193 180 166 134 147 128 130 133 118 118
45 37 41 35 46 24 36 23 27 15
      
      
172 189 178 148 133 144 131 113 104  94
154 148 142 145 110 105 118 91 73  92
192 194 205 205 213 218 202 203 218 197
67  96 143 144 156 159 139 154 126 117
      
MPCR=0.75      
203 188 212 203 202 187 176 165 168 177
153 180 222 203 198 201 148 147 142 158
203 209 205 221 230 236 239 231 224 194
65 87 91 79  119 103 89 128 76 85
      
*Average group contributions net of own contributions.  "CO" indicates cooperator, and "FR" indicates free-rider. 
 
 38Table 3 
 
Estimated Contribution Decision Rules
a 
 
        
Coefficient Cooperators Free Riders
    
Constant -1.63 -12.34
  (-0.40) (-3.61)
 
MPCR=0.5 10.99 2.82
  (4.74) (1.51)
 
MPCR=0.75 14.26 -1.95
  (5.57) (-0.60)
 
Round -0.53 -0.88
  (-1.51) (-2.17)
 
Lagged Individual  0.33 1.02
Contribution  (2.90) (8.35)
 
Lagged Individual   -0.0010 -0.0093
Contribution Squared  (-0.90) (-5.56)
 
Lagged Group Contribution  0.16 0.18
  (3.75) (3.91)
 
Lagged Group Contribution   -0.0007 -0.0006
Squared  (-3.98) (-3.00)
 
Lagged Individual* Lagged   0.0032 0.0035
Group Contribution  (6.194) (5.83)
 
 33.51 23.92
        
    
a t-statistics in parentheses.    
 
 39Table 4 
 
Mean Number of Free-Riders Encountered by Cooperators per Round 
 
 
           
      
  MPCR=0.30   
 Sorted  0.70  
 Random  1.71  
  MPCR=0.50   
 Sorted  0.70  
 Random  0.82  
  MPCR=0.75   
 Sorted  0.40  
 Random  0.51  
           
 













MAX      Pi(i)r(n-1)gi-C i([1-r]gi)
0 giwi
A.  Different Cost Functions: Ci
j,  j = 1,2,3.








 41Figure  2 
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 45Figure 4 
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 46Figure 5 
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